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CASE NOTES
general advertising or an occasional presence of a delivery truck in the
taxing state. It must be admitted, however, that the activities described,
especially the entrance of the delivery truck into the taxing state, present
a borderline situation. That fact, plus the ratio between the majority and
minority of the court, leads to the observation that perhaps little
more activity in the taxing state was necessary to give Maryland jurisdic-
tion. However, due to the great emphasis on factual situations, future cases
concerning the collection of use taxes from nonresident merchants might
be easily distinguished.
TAXATION-STOCK OPTION GIVEN AS COMPENSATION
HELD INCOME UPON GRANTING
Petitioner entered into a two-year employment contract and was grant-
ed a stock option as part of the contract, to be exercised within the
two-year period. Although the option was exercised in part the first
year, and the remainder the second year, both the petitioner and his
employer treated the option as "compensation" for services rendered the
first year, using the difference between the fair market value of the stock
at the time the option was granted and the option price as the basis for
their income tax return. The Tax Court agreed that the option was in-
tended as additional "compensation" but held that the dates of exercise
determined the income to be reported. On review, the Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court, holding that the option was intended as addi-
tional compensation for services for the year in which the option was
granted and thus it was taxable in that year only. McNamara v. Con-
7m issioner of Internal Revenue, 210 F. 2d 505 (C.A. 7th, 1954).
The petitioner, on August 24, 1945, entered into an employment con-
tract with the National Tea Company for a term of two years begin-
ning March 21, 1945, which, among other things, contained a provision
to the effect that he was to receive a stated salary of $27,500 with addi-
tional annual compensation of two per cent of the net profits over
$300,000. In addition the petitioner was granted the following option
by National on August 24, 1945:
... this certifies that an option is hereby extended to said HARLEY V. MC-
NAMARA, his heirs, . .. and assigns, to expire on August 24, 1947, to pur-
chase 12,500 shares of the common stock of this corporation,... at such times
prior to August 24, 1947, as he or they shall elect, upon the payment to this
corporation of the cash sum of $16.00 for each share so purchased. ...
On the same day the board of directors of National, at a special meet-
ing, adopted the following resolution:
WHEREAS, the Executive Committee of this corporation has recommended
that, in addition to the stated cash payments on account of salary and such
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additional contingent compensation as is now in effect, the compensations of
Harley V. McNamara ... for the current year shall include the options here-
inafter specified;
Now, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the compensation of said officers for
the present fiscal year shall be and the same are hereby fixed at cash salaries
of $27,500 for said Harley V. McNamara .... and in addition thereto stock
options, as provided for in the succeeding paragraph.
The petitioner accepted the option and signed the agreement on
September 12, 1945. The market price of the stock on August 24, 1945,
and September 12, 1945, was $19.00 and $20.00 per share respectively.
The option was exercised on March 12, 1946, and March 6, 1947, peti-
tioner purchasing 6,250 shares each time. The fair market value of the
stock on these dates was $28.50 and $27.00 per share respectively. Na-
tional in its 1945 federal income tax return claimed a deduction of $16,-
374 in respect to the option granted, as compensation to petitioner; simi-
larly, the petitioner included this amount as additional compensation
received from National in his 1945 income tax return.
The primary question here is whether, upon the exercise of a stock
option, the petitioner realized income in the form of compensation meas-
ured by the difference between the option price paid and the fair mar-
ket value of the stock acquired and, if the petitioner realized income,
whether it was taxable in the year 1945 when the option was granted,
or in the years 1946 and 1947 when the option was exercised. The In-
ternal Revenue Code broadly defines gross income,' and such all inclu-
sive terms indicate a legislative intent that income should be taxed com-
prehensively. The regulations state that compensation results when prop-
erty is transferred by an employer to an employee for an amount less
than its fair market value.2 The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that
if an employee receives a stock option on or after February 26, 1945, he
realizes taxable income by way of compensation on the date upon which
he receives the stock to the extent of the difference between the fair
market value of the stock when it is received and the price paid there-
fore, or if the employee transfers such option for consideration, he real-
izes taxable income by way of compensation on the date he receives
such consideration to the extent of the value of such consideration.3 For
many years the law has been very confused as to the tax treatment to
be accorded stock options, some courts treating them as compensation
while others as merely a proprietary interest. In all cases the intention
of the parties has been held to be the controlling factor in determining
1 Int. Rev. Code § 22 (a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22 (a) (1949).
2Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a)-1 (1949).
31.T. 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 15 (1946).
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this question.4 The courts looked to the intention to determine whether
the employer sought to compensate his employee or to give him a pro-
prietary interest. If the former, they held the employee realized taxable
income in the form of compensation; 5 if the latter, they held that the
transaction was considered not to have resulted in income to the em-
ployee upon the granting or upon the exercise of the option.6 On the
other hand, an assignable option has been recognized as property in itself,7
but where it was found unassignable it has been held that there was
no market value at time of issuance,8 or that its value was highly specu-
lative, 9 or that its market value was not established, 10 and thus com-
pensation was realized only upon its exercise.
The contention of the petitioner was that whatever income he re-
ceived by reason of the option was realized only in 1945 when the
option was granted, and consisted merely of the fair market value of
the option, or in the alternative, that he realized no income whatever by
reason of the option, or its exercise because it represented a proprietary
interest. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction claimed by Nation-
al, assessed a deficiency, and conversely held that petitioner received
no taxable income by the receipt of the option in 1945, and determined
an overassessment due taxpayer for that year. On the other hand, the
Commissioner determined, that under the Internal Revenue Code" and
applicable regulations, 12 the petitioner received additional compensation
4 Bogardus v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 302 U.S. 34 (1937); Connolly
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 135 F. 2d 64 (C.A. 6th, 1943); Mason v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 125 F. 2d 540 (C.A. 6th, 1942); Martin L. Strauss,
11 T.C.M. 786 (1952); Donald B. Bradner, 11 T.C.M. 566 (1952); Malcolm S. Clark,
9 T.C.M. 719 (1950); James M. Lamond, 5 T.C.M. 51 (1946).
5 Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952).
6 Rossheim v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 92 F. 2d 247 (C.A. 3rd, 1937);
Norman G. Nicolson, 13 T.C. 690 (1949); Martin L. Strauss, 11 T.C.M. 786 (1952).
7 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945); Helvering v.
San Joaquin Fruit & Investment Co., 297 U.S. 496 (1936).
8 Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952).
9 Van Dusen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 166 F. 2d 647 (C.A. 9th, 1948).
10 John C. Wahl, 19 T.C. 651 (1953).
1"Int. Rev. Code, § 22 (a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22 (a) (1949). "General definitions.
'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages,
or compensation for personal service . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form
paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or deal-
ings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use
of interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the
transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and
income derived from any source whatever. .. "
12 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a)-1 (1949). "If property is transferred by an employer
to an employee for an amount less than its fair market value, regardless of whether
the transfer is in the form of a sale or exchange, the difference between the amount
paid for the property and the amount of its fair market value is in the nature of
compensation and shall be included in the gross income of the employee. .. ."
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in the years 1946 and 1947 representing the difference between the fair
market value of the stock and the option price when the option was
exercised. The Tax Court found that the option was intended as com-
pensation and not merely to give the petitioner a proprietary interest
in the corporation; that the compensation intended was not the value
of the option but was the difference between the fair market value of
the stock on the date of exercise and the option price; that the option
was not the only intended compensation, and that even though assign-
able neither party contemplated assignment or sale; and that the option
itself did not represent a property interest, which could be disposed
of without a sacrifice.
As authority for its decision, the Tax Court cited Connolly's Estate v.
Commissioner.1" In that case, the employee was given an option to pur-
chase the company's stock for much less than market value, to be exer-
cised within three years. The market value of the stock at date of option
was $2.35 and at date of purchase was $5.00. The corporate minutes
indicated that it was granted as adjusted compensation for services
rendered. The court held that the taxable income was determined on
the dates the option was exercised and not as of the date granted. An-
other case relied on by the Tax Court was Van Dusen v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue.'4 The employer in that case gave his employee an
option to purchase fifty shares of stock per month at $5.00 per share,
for a period of ten years. The option was conditioned upon both parties
to the option living and remaining employees of the corporation. At the
time the option was granted, its market value was $9.00 per share. During
the subsequent four years, the employee bought stock for a price much
less than the market value of the stock at the time of purchase. The
court held that aside from the fact that the employee could exercise the
option only so long as he remained an employee of the corporation,
there existed no basis for arriving at a value for the option on the date
granted. The court held further that the restrictive conditions together
with the possibility of decline in market value led logically to the con-
clusion that the value of the option could scarcely have been more than
nominal at the time it was granted, and therefore was intended as com-
pensation when exercised.
In reversing the Tax Court, the instant court does so without citing
authorities, basing its decision solely on the distinguishing facts in the
case. Although the option had value when it was granted, the court
distinguishes the Connolly case on two points: (1) there was nothing in
the resolutions authorizing an option in that case, nor was there any-
thing in the options indicating that the parties intended the additional
compensation to be "for the current year" or "for the fiscal year," and
13 135 F. 2d 64 (C.A. 6th, 1943). 14 166 F, 2d 647 (C.A. 9th, 1948).
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(2) neither party made any report of the option in his income tax re-
turns in the year the option was granted.
The fact that the disposal value of the option was speculative, coupled
with the failure of both the employer and employee to claim any deduc-
tion in their income tax returns for the value of the stock when given,
was sufficient for the court to distinguish the Van Dusen case from the
instant case.
The only authority cited for the holding in the instant case was the
dicta contained in the case of Connnissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Smith.15 Although the court in that case held that the compensation was
not confined to the mere delivery of an option of no value, but included
the compensation obtainable by the exercise of the option given for that
purpose, the court further stated:
When the option price is less than the market price of the property for the
purchase of which the option is given, it may have present value and may be
found to be itself compensation for services rendered.1
It is upon this statement that the instant court relies.
This case is significant because it is the first to hold that the value of
the option, when granted, is the amount to be reported as income. How-
ever, the possibility of other courts following this precedent is slight
because none seem to favor the taxpayer as much as the instant court, and
since the decisions in such cases rest on the facts involved, courts will
have little trouble distinguishing other cases from the instant case.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-HEART ATTACK
HELD WITHIN STATUTE
The plaintiff was a police captain whose duties were mainly supervisory.
On the day in question, plaintiff led an emergency search for a fugitive,
an activity unusual to the normal performance of his duties. Because of
the heavy strain of walking three hours over rugged terrain and the
digging out of his car, which had become stuck in the sand, the plain-
tiff suffered a heart attack and was permanently disabled. Action was
brought to recover compensation. The court allowed the claim, holding
that the disability was a result of strain on the heart due to unusual
exertion and was an "accident arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.'
Hathaway v. New Mexico State Police, 57 N.M. 747, 263 P. 2d 690
(1953).
Generally, when the courts speak of "accident" as used in Workmen's
Compensation Acts, they are construing the term liberally and in its
15 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
16 Ibid., at 181. 1 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1941 Comp. §§ 57-902.
